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COMMENTS
WEB OF MANIPULATION: THE LEARNED
INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE AND DIRECTTO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING ON THE
WORLD WIDE WEB
APRIL L. FOREMAN*

And this distilled liquor drink thou off.
When, presently, through all thy veins shall
A cold and drowsy humour; for no pulse
Shall Take thou this vial, being then in bed,
keep his native progress, but surcease:
No warmth, no breath, shall testify thou liv'st;
The roses in thy lips and cheeks shall fade
To paly ashes; thy eyes' windows fall,
Like death, when he shuts up the day of life;
And in this borrow'd likeness of shrunk death:
Thou shalt continue two-and-forty hours,
And then awake as from a pleasantsleep.'
INTRODUCTION

This exchange between Juliet and Friar Lawrence illustrates
that a recipient's need for a drug provider's warning is nothing
new.2 Unlike today, in Juliet's time an apothecary both made and
* J.D. Candidate, 2002. B.A. in Humanities and Political Science from
Brigham Young University. The Author wishes to thank Professor Alberto
Bernabe for his help in bringing this paper to pass, her parents for their
support, and her husband Jason for his medical knowledge and for being her
rock through it all.
1. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
COMPLETE WORKS 1065, 1091 (William Allan Neilson & James Orchard
Halliwell-Phillips eds., 1925). In this section of Mr. Shakespeare's play, Friar
Lawrence is warning Juliet about the effects of the vial she will take later that
evening. Id.
2. In our culture there are many legends about and relating to drugs.
RICHARD RUDGLEY, ESSENTIAL SUBSTANCES: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
INTOXICANTS IN SOCIETY, 105-37 (1993). Sources suggest our belief in flying
witches is a result of medieval storytellers' usage of hallucinogenic drugs. Id.
at 105-09; H. SIDKY, WITCHCRAFT, LYCANTHROPY, DRUGS AND DISEASE, 189214 (1997). See 1 HENRY E. SIGERIST, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE: PRIMITIVE
AND ARCHAIC MEDICINE 205, 205 (1987) (discussing uses of ancient Cherokee
medicinal rites and rituals, specifically in this instance the "Spirit of the
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marketed his own pharmaceutical wares.3 As both the creator and
distributor, Friar Lawrence was the one to warn Juliet about the
4
effects of ingesting the tiny vial.
Today, however, the prescription drug industry is trifurcated.5
Mammoth pharmaceutical companies manufacture drugs, doctors
prescribe drugs, and pharmacies6 distribute them.7 With all these
parties participating in the process the question becomes: whose
duty is it to warn the modern-day Juliet about a drug's effects?"
Today, while an "unwarned" Juliet may have a cause of action
against the doctor who prescribed her a drug if he failed to warn
her of its effects, the drug manufacturers, the modern-day
apothecaries of the potent vial, can shield themselves from attack
behind the outdated Learned Intermediary Doctrine.9
Weasel"). For a history of medicine and drugs divided by geographical region,
see generally, ROY PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO MANKIND: A MEDICAL
HISTORY OF HUMANITY (1997).
3. For a history of apothecaries see OXFORD, WESTERN MEDICINE: AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 18, 62-63, 68-69, 73, 81-82, 86, 90-91 (Irvine London
ed., 1997).
4. See generally Shakespeare, supra note 1. The text of the play does not
state whether Friar Lawrence made the contents of the vial. The readers can
glean from the text that the good Friar did have a herb garden, and knowledge
of the herbs' poisonous and medicinal powers. Id. at 1076.
5. See ALFRED BURGER, DRUGS AND PEOPLE: MEDICATIONS, THEIR
HISTORY AND ORIGINS, AND THE WAY THEY ACT 21-23, (revised ed., 1986)
(explaining how the pharmaceutical drug companies advertise directly to
doctors hoping to sell more of "their drugs"). See generally JOHN P. SWANN,
ACADEMIC SCIENTISTS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTtiY: COOPERATIVE
RESEARCH IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 15 (1988).
Drugs
6. See,
e.g.,
In
re
Diet
(Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability Litigation,
No. 1533, 2000 WL 1886594, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2000) (discussing the
fluxuating state of the law and duties imputed within the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine for pharmacists and pharmacies). While the duties of a
pharmacist to warn the end consumer and how that interacts with doctors and
manufacturers is a fascinating topic, this Comment unfortunately cannot
cover all the new aspects of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine.
7. See generally BURGER, supra note 5; SWANN, supra note 5. See also
Lisa Friedman Miner, How Drugs Ads Influence Your Health, DAILY HERALD,
Apr. 24, 2000, § 3 at 1 (noting that in our society we use drugs to escape the
stress of emotional and physical maladies).
8. See BURGER, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing how "no drug has just one
effect"). When using drugs one must balance between the drug's clinical
effects and its toxic results. Id. Taking Mr. Burger's statements into account,
one sees the need for warnings about the balanced "toxic effects" with the
hoped for clinical results. Id.
9. See, e.g., Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 214 F.3d 73, 79 (2nd Cir. 2000) (barring
plaintiffs suit because of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine); Alexander v.
Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1309 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (holding
that in Oklahoma the "Learned Intermediary Doctrine is an exception to the
duty to warn" and that the drug manufacturer's duty to warn only extends to
the doctor); Anderson v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D.
Tex. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs doctor was a Learned Intermediary and
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Part I explores both the background and evolution of directto-consumer (DTC) advertising, from the Federal Drug Agency
(FDA) moratorium on DTC advertising to the present day, and the
history and basis for the Learned Intermediary Doctrine. Part II
explores prescription drug advertising on the World Wide Web and
how Internet advertising contradicts the premises upon which the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine is based. Part II also specifically
concentrates upon how this type of advertising is undercutting the
doctor-patient relationship. Part III proposes using a sliding-scale
test to measure the interactivity of web sites to determine which
sites are undercutting the doctor-patient relationship upon which
the Learned Intermediary Doctrine is based.
I.

THE "STAR-CROSSED LOVERS:"" DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER

ADVERTISING AND THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE

This Section discusses the evolution of DTC advertising in the
pharmaceutical drug industry over the last twenty years and the
history of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine. This Section also
depicts conflicts between the two, which arise as a result of
pharmaceutical advertising on the Internet.
A. Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising
1.

FDA Standards and Guidelines

Until the early 1980s prescription drug manufacturers
typically advertised to medical professionals, but not to end
consumers."
Shortly after the dawn of DTC advertising, on
September 2, 1983, the FDA issued a statement requesting that
the pharmaceutical industry hold a voluntary moratorium on
product-specific DTC advertising. 2 The FDA reasoned that this
moratorium would allow time for the "consumers, health
professionals and industry" to discuss the relevant issues, and
allow time to research the effects of DTC advertising. 13 On
September 9, 1985, the FDA withdrew the moratorium, stating

was in a position to warn her of the impending risks, and the drug company's
duty to warn only extended to the doctor); Ramos v. Sterling Drug, Inc., No.
04-98-01009-CV, 1999 WL 1261527, at *1 (Tex. App. Ct. Dec. 29, 1999)
(applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine denying that a pharmaceutical

company had a "duty to warn the deceased").
10. Shakespeare, supra note 1, at 1065.
11. Thomas M. Moore & Mario Horwitz, Consumer Directed Broadcast
Advertising: Erosion of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine?, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Sept. 1998, at 20-21; Noah Lars, Advertising PrescriptionDrugs to
Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REv. 141,
141 (1997).
12. Moore & Horwitz, supra note 11, at 20; Lars, supra note 11, at 142-43.
13. Moore & Horwitz, supra note 11 at 20; Lars, supra note 11, at 142-43.

The John Marshall Law Review

[35:97

that it achieved its purpose and that the current laws were
sufficient to govern DTC broadcast advertising.14
Although the FDA lifted the moratorium, the pervasive
sentiment in the industry gathered from the FDA's action was that
it still discouraged all DTC advertising. 15 Ten years later,
however, on August 16, 1995, the FDA announced a hearing on the
"DTC 'promotion' of prescription drugs." 6 The hearing
brought
7
together the interested parties to gather information.
On August 12, 1997, the FDA relaxed its stance and issued a
Draft Guidance for the industry concerning consumer-directed
broadcast advertisements 8 (including radio, television, systems
which communicate
through phone lines, or telephone
communication systems). 9 Then, in August of 1999 the FDA
released a final Guidance for Industry concerning broadcast
advertising. 2° This subsequent Guidance is very similar to the
Draft Guidance,2 and reinforces the FDA's view that when using
14. Moore & Horwitz, supra note 11, at 20; Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
of Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of Mortorium, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,677 (Sept. 9,
1985).
15. Draft Guidance for Industry;
Consumer
Direct Broadcast
Advertisements Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171 (Aug. 12, 1997) [hereinafter
Draft Guidance for Industry]; Moore & Horwitz, supra note 11, at 20-21. See
also CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE
FOR
INDUSTRY,
CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST
ADVERTISEMENTS
(Aug.
1999),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2001)
[hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY] (illustrating the FDA's sentiment
about DTC advertising, albeit slightly relaxed is still very consumer oriented
and still strongly encourages the prescription drug industry to provide
consumers with "nonpromotional, consumer-friendly product information" in
their advertisements). The FDA also suggests that the pharmaceutical
industry submit data and research on the effects DTC advertising has on
consumers. Id.
16. Direct to Consumer Protection; Public Hearing, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,581
(Aug. 16, 1995); Draft Guidance for Industry, supra note 15, at 43,172. See
also Moore & Horwitz, supra note 11, at 22-23 (discussing six specific issues
about which the FDA expressed interest for its 1995 hearings).
17. Moore and Horwitz, supra note 11, at 20-21; James M. Johnstone,
Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising: An Industry Perspective, 47 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 63, 65 (1992); Draft Guidance for Industry, supra note 15, at 43,172. The
actual FDA hearing was held on October 18th and 19th of 1995 in Silver
Spring, MD. Id. The FDA published a follow-up document to alleviate public
concerns about pre-clearance of DTC promotional materials. Direct-toConsumer Promotion, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,314, 24,314-15 (May 14, 1996).
18. Draft Guidance for Industry, supra note 15, at 43,171.
19. Michael C. Allen, Comment, Medicine Goes Madison Avenue: An
Evaluation of the Effect of Direct-to-ConsumerPharmaceuticalAdvertising on
the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 113, 115 (1997);

FDA Eases Rules for Televised Drug Ads, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, (Raleigh,
N.C.), Aug. 9, 1997, at Al.
20. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 15.
21. CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG
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broadcast media, the industry must provide information about the
risks of each prescription drug through a "major statement" in the
advertisement.22
Both the 1997 Draft Guidance and 1999
Guidance for Industry allow drug manufacturers who advertise
through broadcast media to use adequately distributed approved
package inserts (inside the product itself)" as an alternative to the
already
required
brief
summary'
of
"side
effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness" of the prescription drug.25
2. Product-SpecificAdvertising
Rogaine was the first subscription drug to be directly
advertised to consumers.26 Rogaine, a prescription drug used for
male pattern baldness, was the model test drug for DTC
advertising because it was easily analogized to the birth control
exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Since Rogaine's
ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST
ADVERTISEMENTS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, (Aug. 1999), available at

http://www.fda.gov/cder/ guidance/1804q&a.htm [hereinafter QUESTIONS &
ANSWERS] (describing the differences between the Draft Guidance issued in
1997 and the final Guidancefor Industry issued in August of 1999).
22. See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 15 (defining a major
statement as a needed statement of a prescription drug's major risks during
the audio or visual presentation when a company advertises in broadcast
media rather than print).
23. Id.; The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2000).
The statute that governs advertising for prescription drugs in humans and
animals is § 502(n) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id. This
statute requires that biological products include a "brief summary." Draft
Guidance For Industry. 21 CFR §§ 202.1 require further that the brief
summary also include all "risk-related information" in a "product's approved
package labeling." Draft Guidance For Industry. As the Draft Guidance and
Guidance for Industry rules further explain, this can be either a package
insert or a product package insert. Draft Guidance for Industry, supra note
15, at 43,172. See also Moore & Horwitz, supra note 11, at 22-23 (suggesting
that the Draft Guidance (which is very similar to the Guidance for Industry)
along with other requirements requires that the package insert "be provided
directly to 'the majority of a potentially diverse audience."').
24. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2000).
25. Id.; GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 15.
26. John D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation,112 HARv. L. REV. 1420, 1456 (1999).
See also Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1251 (N.J. 1999)
(describing the unique role of a cosmetic drug for male pattern baldness
heralding the entrance of direct-to-consumer advertising); Tim S. Hall,
Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: Potential Liability for Failure to Warn
in Direct-to-ConsumerPrescriptionDrug Advertising, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 449, 462-64 (1993) (characterizing early prescription drug campaigns as
informative and not product specific).
27. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1251 (discussing that the "[a]dvertising for Rogaine
was just the tip of the iceberg"). See also Hall, supra note 26, at 27
(suggesting that Upjohn's selection of Rogaine to be the first drug to be used in
product-specific advertising was "ideal" because it was cosmetic, and easily
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debut on the advertising stage, prescription drug manufacturers
have inundated consumers with product-specific advertising.2
Though the first DTC advertisements, while product-specific, did
not mention the drug's purpose,29 consumers are now daily regaled
with advertised medications for everything from smoking
cessation to erectile dysfunction. 30 This advertising freedom allows
pharmaceutical industries to launch successful and lucrative
31
campaigns.
Recently, the pharmaceutical industry marketing campaigns
crossed over into cyber-advertising.32 To date, the FDA has not
issued further regulation of this advertising medium subsequent
to the 1999 Guidance for Industry.3 And more disturbingly, the
analogized to the birth control exception of the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine). See infra Part I(B)(1)(b) of this Comment for further explanation.
28. Draft Guidance for Industry, supra note 15, at 43,171; Miner, supra
note 7, at 1. See also Perez, 734 A.2d at 1251 (describing Claritin, a histamine
blocker, that contributed to the explosion of DTC advertising of prescription
drugs).
29. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1251. Perez comments on the viewers confusion after
watching many of the first product-specific advertisements as to exactly what
Claritin treated or for what its use. Id.
30. See Miner, supra note 7 (illustrating by chart the amount of profit made
by various manufacturers using DTC advertising).
31. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1251-52; Lars, supra note 11, at 141. See also Robert
Pear, Drug Companies Getting F.D.A. Reprimands for False or Misleading
Advertising, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, at 28 (discussing how prescription
drug companies spend 1.3 billion dollars on consumer directed advertising in
1998); Miner, supra note 7, at 1 (illustrating by chart the millions of dollars
spent on various advertised prescription drugs).
32. See Robert Pear, Marketing Tied to Increase In PrescriptionDrug Sales,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2000, at A18 (describing the various sources where
consumers now get their healthcare information). For example, many drug
advertisements on the Internet are histamine-blockers. See also Aventis,
Clartin Products, Claritin 10 mg Tablets (Loratadine)For Seasonal Allergy
Relief, at http://www.claritin.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001); Eli Lilly and
Company, Flonase (Fluticasone Propionate) Nasal Spray, 50 mcg, at
http://www.flonase.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001); GlaxoWellcome
Webmaster Once-Daily Allegra Fexonfenadine HCL 180 mg Tablets, at
http://www.allegra.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001); Mereck & Co., Pfizer Inc.,
Prozac Fluoxetine Hydrochloride, at http://www.prozac.com (last visited Jan.
18, 2001); Warner-Lambert Co., Lipitor.com... Your Personal Source for
Cholesterol
Information:
Lipitor
Atorvastatin
Calcium,
at
http://www.lipitor.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001); Zocor (Simvastatin) It's
your future. Be There., at http://www.zocor.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001);
Zyrtec (R) (Cetirizine HCL): Lots of Allergies. Just One Little Pill, at
http://www.zyrtec.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
33. See Kelly N. Reeves, Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertising:
Empowering the Consumer or Manipulating a Vulnerable Population?, 53
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 661, 676 (1998) (pointing out the Draft Guidance's lack of
elaboration on Internet web site advertising "except to note that the web site
must provide the approved product labeling"). See also GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY, supra note 15 (illustrating the FDA's sentiment about DTC
advertising, albeit slightly relaxed is still very consumer oriented and still
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web has become another interactive tool of the pharmaceutical
industry to ensnare more consumers.4
B. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: History
The Learned Intermediary Doctrine evolved in case law
during the mid-1960s.35
This doctrine is a defense used by
prescription drug and medical device manufacturers in product
liability cases to the extent that a plaintiffs claim is based upon
the failure to warn doctrine. 6 The Learned Intermediary Doctrine
relieves the drug manufacturers of their duty to warn the end
consumer about the risks of a prescription drug, but preserves the
manufacturers' duty to warn the physician, who must in turn
warn the end consumer.37 Under this doctrine, courts position
doctors as educated middlemen between the final consumer and
the prescription drug manufacturers.38
Courts justify the
allocation of duties by noting that doctors are in a better position
strongly encourages the prescription drug industry to provide consumers with
"nonpromotional,

consumer-friendly
product
information"
in their
advertisements).
The 1999 Guidance For Industry also lacks further
explanation about the Internet. Id.
34. Pear, supra note 31, at 18.
35. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966)
(holding that a drug manufacturer had a duty to warn a Learned Intermediary
about the possible side effects a drug could have on some patients); Teresa
Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the
Learned IntermediaryRule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829, 830-31 (describing
the evolution of the Learned Intermediary Rule). See generally Love v. Wolf,
226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
36. See Baraukas v. Danek Med., Inc., No. 6:97CV00613, 2000 WL 223508,
at *4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2000) (applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to
a medical device that is used in an experimental back surgery). See also IDA
G. DOX ET AL., ATTORNEY'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY P17 (1997)

(describing a pedicle of the vertebral arch as one of two bars of bone that
extends backwards from the body of each vertebra, these pedicles are parts of
the vertebral arch that surround the spinal cord). For further information,
diagrams and pictures see GRAY'S ANATOMY: THE ANATOMICAL BASIS OF

MEDICINE AND SURGERY, 511-28 (38th ed. 1995) (discussing the various parts
of the skeletal system).
37. Baraukas, 2000 WL 223508, at *4. See also Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 214
F.3d 73, 76 (describing a manufacturer's duty to warn only physicians); Ramos
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1999 WL 1261527, at *1 (limiting prescription drug
manufactures' duty to only the physicians and not end consumers); Alexander
v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1321 (requiring the
manufacturers, under Oklahoma law, to warn physicians rather than
patients); Anderson v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806
(extending a manufacturers' duty to warn only to doctors and not to patients);
Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (describing the exception to
product liability concept of the "ultimate purchaser" within the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine).
38. Baraukas, 2000 WL 223508 at *4; Vitanza, 214 F.3d at 76; Ramos, 1999
WL 1261527 at *1; Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 806; Alexander, 98 F. Supp. 2d
at 1321; Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.
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than drug manufacturers to warn the end consumer about a drug's
effects."9
There are six basic premises underlying the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine: 40 (1) doctors have the requisite experience
and training, and they, not the patients or the drug companies,
ultimately make the decision to prescribe or not to prescribe a
drug;4' (2) in traditional doctor-patient relationships, patients rely
heavily upon the doctor's advice and counsel concerning their
health, not upon the advice of drug manufacturers;4 2 (3) courts
hesitate to intervene into the doctor-patient relationship, and
constrain a doctor's independent judgment about what should or
should not be prescribed to patients; 43 (4) drug manufacturers do
not have a relationship or other effective means to communicate

39. See Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (holding that the plaintiffs doctor
was a Learned Intermediary and was in a position to warn her of the
impending risks, and the drug company's duty to warn only extended to the
doctor); Alexander, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (holding that the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine requires the drug manufacturer to warn the physician
and a physician relying upon his own judgment should treat and warn the
patient). See generally Vitanza, 214 F.3d at 76; Ramos, 1999 WL 1261527, at
*1.
40. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255 (listing four premises for the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine: "(1) reluctance to undermine the doctor-patient
relationship; (2) absence in the era of 'doctor knows best' of a need for the
patient's informed consent; (3) inability of the drug manufacturer to
communicate with the patient; and (4) complexity of the subject"); Allen, supra
note 19, at 120 (listing five reasons for the Learned Intermediary Doctrine,
which describes why the doctor is in the best position to warn the end
consumer including a physician's training and experience and the physician's
professional evaluation of patient needs). See also Alexander, 98 F. Supp. 2d
at 1321 (discussing the premise that a physician needs his independent
judgment); Schwartz, supra note 35, at 830-31 (characterizing physicians as
the better to decide because: (1) physicians, not patients prescribe drugs,
therefore patients have little need for risk benefit information; (2) physicians'
have the responsibility to inform patients in order to obtain their "informed
consent"; (3) by providing warnings directly to consumers, drug manufacturers
could interfere with the doctor-patient relationship, deterring patients from
taking prescribed medications; and (4) it is very difficult to provide adequate
warnings to consumers about the risks and benefits of prescription drugs
through a drug label or package insert that they can genuinely understand).
41. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255 (listing as a justification for applying the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine the "complexity of risk information," reasoning
that patients may not understand the information even if by the
manufacturers relay the information); Allen, supra note 19, at 120 (listing the
importance of a physicians training and experience).
42. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255 (suggesting that a premise to the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine is that a patient's informed consent was not necessary
because doctors knew best).
43. Id. See also Alexander, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (discussing the premise
of a physician's independent judgment); Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 806
(characterizing the doctor-patient relationship); Schwartz, supra note 35, at
830 (discussing undermining the doctor-patient relationship).

20011

Web of Manipulation

with the end consumers because drugs are prescribed through
doctors, and distributed by pharmacies; (5) even if drug
manufacturers warned consumers, the complexity of the risks and
warnings would be difficult to translate into understandable riskconveying language for the untrained consumer;44 and (6) if
manufacturers directly warn uninformed consumers, they may
deter patients from taking the prescribed medicines or following
4
their doctor's advice."
46
Critics, however, take issue with these outdated premises.
First, while doctors are still in the unique position to prescribe
drugs, patients today are often actively involved in the decision
process about which drug to take. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey stated that we are no longer in the era of "the Norman
Rockwell" image of the family where the paternalistic family
doctor exists.
The court reasoned that "patient choice" is now
part of our medical-legal case law rather than the assumption that
"doctor knows best."
Second, while patients often rely on their
doctors' advice, busy modern physicians are under time
constraints and may fail to relate and warn the patients of all the
possible risks associated with the prescribed drug.49 Critics of the
Learned Intermediary Defense argue that this responsibility to
warn the end consumer should not fall exclusively on the
physician."0 Third, requiring pharmaceutical companies to give
additional warnings directly to consumers in the form of inserts or
another medium would not take away from the doctor's autonomy,
it would simply supplement the doctor's own warnings to the
patient. 1 Fourth, as a consequence of advertising, drug companies
themselves have undercut the doctor-patient relationship because
instead of relying upon a doctor's advice, patients now are asking
their doctors for drugs by name." The critics argue that if the

44. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 830 (discussing undermining the doctorpatient relationship).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Drug
Manufacturer to the Consumer, 40 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 135, 136; Reeves,
supra note 33, at 675-76; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Faulty Warning Labels Add to
Risk in PrescriptionDrugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999 at A27.
47. Rheingold, supra note 46, at 136.
48. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255. See Reeves, supra note
33, at 671 (illustrating the shift from a doctor-choice to a patient-choice
medical environment).
49. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255; Stolberg, supra note 46, at A27 (discussing the
results of a 1,000 patient survey which found that only one-third had received
information from their physicians about the dangerous side-effects of the

drugs the doctors prescribed to them).
50. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255; Stolberg, supra note 46, at A27.
51. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255; Stolberg, supra note 46, at A27.
52. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256. See Tamar v. Terzian, Direct-to-Consumer
PrescriptionDrug Advertising, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 157 (1999) (stating
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rationale for the Learned Intermediary Doctrine is that a doctor is
in the best position to warn end consumers because he or she can
communicate with them, this reasoning should now extend to drug
manufacturers because they also communicate with the end
consumer via advertisement.53 Consequently, drug manufacturers
should no longer escape their duty to warn the consumer.'
However, the law in this area is still developing, as evidenced by
the Third Restatement of Torts' median stance.5
1.

Exceptions to the Learned IntermediaryDoctrine

There are two exceptions to the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine:56
mass
immunizations/vaccinations57
and
birth
control/contraceptives."
At the root of both exceptions is the
presumption that the Learned Intermediary, the doctor, has been
bypassed in these situations. This bypass occurs either because of
the method by which the patient receives the drug" or because of
the patient choice involved in the prescription process. 61
that because of DTC advertising, patients are now coming to doctors with
preconceived notions and information about prescription drugs, which can
ultimately decrease doctors' treatment choices if they concede to their patients'
requests). Ms. Terzian continues offering an example of what occurred when
doctors gave patients the combination of two prescription drugs know as fenphen. Id. Moreover, DTC advertising forces doctors between a rock and a
hard place. Id. at 157-58. They must balance between their patients'
uninformed and unprofessionally diagnosed wants and the possibility of losing
patients. Id.; Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs:
Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HX,AIDS, and the Diet Drug
Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 98-99 (1999) (relating how a patient's ability to
direct their own treatment is empowering, but this empowerment can turn
into bullying of prescribing doctors, resulting in terrible side-effects).
53. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255-56.
54. Id.
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 (d) (1) (1998) (describing a
prescription drug as unsafe when warnings and instructions are not given to
either the health-care providers "in a position to reduce risk" or the patient if
there is no one else in a position to reduce the risk of harm).
56. See Allen v. G.D. Searle, 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (D. Or. 1989)
(discussing the birth control/contraceptive exception to the rule); Hall, supra
note 26, at 462-64 (describing the exceptions to the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine); Schwartz, supra note 35, at 832 (discussing the two exceptions to
the Learned Intermediary rule). See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d
1264, 1276-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (holding that when
a drug manufacturer knew or had reason to know that the prescription drug
would not be administered by a physician, the manufacturer had a duty to
warn the end consumer).
57. Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1969).
58. See Hall, supra note 26, at 452 (discussing how a patient's choice to use
birth control is likely to be discretionary and "not fueled by medical necessity,"
thus limiting the need for a doctor to determine only the patient's initial
eligibility).
59. Davis, 339 F.2d at 131.
60. Hall, supra note 26, at 463.
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Mass Immunizations

After the evolution of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine,
courts created an exception for mass immunizations. 6' From the
late 1960s through the early 1970s, the courts repeatedly decided
that mass immunizations were an exception to the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine.62 In the case of mass immunization, the
courts reasoned that there was no Learned Intermediary
consulting exclusively with the patient.63
Patients receiving
immunizations, often do so in clinics where the patient or his
guardian decides whether he or she should receive the
immunization.'
b.

Birth Control/Contraceptives 6"

Some courts have also precluded manufacturers of birth
control medications or contraceptive devices from using the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine66 because the role of the Learned
Intermediary is circumvented in this setting by the patient's
choice." Usually, the patient is not in physical necessity of these
drugs or devices, but chooses to use them: it is a personal
decision.' Furthermore, because the patient typically only returns

61. Hall, supra note 26, at 463; Schwartz, supra note 35, at 832.
62. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276; Davis, 339 F.2d at 121.
63. See Davis, 339 F.2d at 131 (holding that when prescription drugs are
dispensed like non-prescription drugs, the drug manufacturer has a duty to
warn the end consumer). See also Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276-77 (holding that in
the Fifth Circuit, when a drug manufacturer knew or had reason to know that
the prescription drug would not be administered by a physician it had a duty
to warn the end consumer).
64. Davis, 339 F.2d at 121; Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276-77.
65. For a discussion of contraceptive cases and tort liability see Virginia H.
Castleberry, Hill v. Searle Laboratories: The Decline of the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine in Favor of Direct Patient Warnings of Drug Product
Risks, 43 ARK. L. REV. 821, (1990) (discussing how the Arkansas Supreme
Court expanded a drug manufacturer's duty to warn by broadening the
exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Defense in Hill v. Searle Labs.). See
also Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1065,1071 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the manufacturer of a copper intrauterine device owed a duty to the end
consumer).
66. TERESA Moran Schwartz, Consumer Warning for Oral Contraceptives:
A New Explanation to the PrescriptionDrug Rule 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
241, 246-50 (1986); Stevens v. G.D. Searle, 602 F. Supp. 379, 380-81 (E.D.
Mich. 1985). See also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68-70
(Mass. 1985) (holding that under Massachusetts law a manufacturer of birth
control pills owes a duty to warn the end consumer of the pills side effects);
Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 878-81 (E.D. Wis. 1985)
modified, 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (holding that under Michigan law
a manufacturer of oral contraceptives must warn the end consumer directly).
67. Allen v. G.D. Searle, 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48.
68. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d at 125 (discussing patient
choice in our "medical-legal jurisprudence").
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on a yearly basis, lessening the chances for a doctor to warn her,
the courts impose a duty to warn on the manufacturer.69
C. Combining DTC and the Learned IntermediaryDoctrine
Recently, DTC advertising and the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine collided. On August 9, 1999, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that "[t]he direct marketing of drugs to consumers
generates a corresponding duty requiring manufacturers to warn
of defects in the product." ° Other courts, although not recognizing
the manufacturers' duty in specific circumstances, are recognizing
that when a prescription drug company participates in DTC
advertising it may preclude itself from a defense under the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine and have a duty to warn the end
71
consumer.
II. DTC

ADVERTISING AND UNDERCUTTING THE DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP

Applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to prescription
drug Internet advertising may have serious consequences for drug
manufacturers and consumers. Section A defines and discusses
the doctor-patient relationship, which is the main premise of the
Learned Intermediary Defense. Then Section B discusses and
evaluates the interactivity of advertising on various prescription
drug web sites, including how these web sites are undercutting the
doctor-patient relationship.
A. The Doctor-PatientRelationship: A Premise to the Learned
IntermediaryDoctrine.
Doctors are far more than an educated avenue for patients to
acquire prescription drugs.72 Doctors are our teachers, counselors,
negotiators, and sometimes our friends. 73 Today, the doctorpatient relationship includes greater patient autonomy than it
previously did.74 Self-help, patient participation and patient choice

69. See MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 69 (discussing the frequency with which
oral contraceptive patients return to the doctor).
70. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1263. In Perez, the court held that there was a
rebuttable presumption that a manufacturer fulfilled its duty if it had
complied with the FDA standards for advertising. Id. at 1259. The current
regulations however, do not expressly address Internet advertising; and thus,
there is no presumed standard against which plaintiffs may rebut.
71. Doe v. Miles Inc., No. ED 75100, 2000 WL 667383, at *17 (Mo. App. Ct.
May 23, 2000).
72. See generally J. ANDREW BILLINGS ET AL., THE CLINICAL ENCOUNTER: A
GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL INTERVIEW AND CASE PRESENTATION 12-72 (2d ed.
1999).
73. See generally id.
74. Id. at 321-22.
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in the scope of diagnosis, and treatment are now all part of an
"ideal doctor-patient relationship. 7 5
The doctor-patient
relationship is similar in many ways to the attorney-client
relationship." Both of these fiduciary relationships are based on
trust and confidence.77 Through this trust and confidence a doctor
is able to acquire needed information and use that information for
the patient's benefit." A lack of information and communication
between doctor and patient may hamper a doctor's ability to assist
patients. 9
Through
DTC
Internet
advertising,
drug
manufacturers may usurp the many roles of a doctor and undercut
the doctor-patient relationship.
B. The Interactive Advertisement-The PrescriptionDrug Web
Sites
The
interactivity
possible between
consumers
and
prescription drug manufacturers through the Internet is far
beyond the interaction possible through standard print, radio or
television
advertisements. °
Using the Internet, drug
manufacturers have increased capabilities to contact the
consumer. Internet advertising is not hampered by time as are
other mediums, enabling the manufacturer to provide the
consumer continuous information. Many interactive web pages
encourage repeat visits with their forecasts or other information

75. Id.

76. See id. at 287-93 (describing how a physician can undermine the basic
trust of a patient through conduct or through breaching the duty of
confidentially).
77. BILLINGS, supra note 72, at 12-72. See generally ABA Center for
Professional Responsibility, Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
Introduction, & §§ 1.6 (1999) (describing the duties and premises behind an
attorney-client relationship).
78. See BILLINGS, supra note 72, at 35 (explaining how doctors' "recognized
role[s]" give them access to intimate information that should only be used for
the patients' benefit).
79. See generally id. at 38-72, 113-62 (relating ways a doctor may approach
a patient to elicit the needed information).
80. See, e.g., Aventis, Clartin Products, Claritin 10 mg Tablets (Loratadine)

For Seasonal Allergy Relief, at http://www.claritin.com (last visited Jan. 18,

2001); Eli Lilly and Company, Flonase (FluticasonePropionate)Nasal Spray,
50 mcg, at http://www.flonase.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001); GlaxoWellcome
Webmaster Once-Daily Allegra Fexonfenadine HCL 180 mg Tablets, at

http://www.allegra.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001); Mereck & Co., Pfizer Inc.,
Prozac Fluoxetine Hydrochloride, at http://www.prozac.com (last visited Jan.
18, 2001); Warner-Lambert Co., Lipitor.com... Your Personal Source for
Cholesterol
Information:
Lipitor
Atorvastatin
Calcium,
at
http://www.lipitor.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001); Zocor (Simvastatin) It's
your future. Be There., at http://www.zocor.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001);
Zyrtec (R) (Cetirizine HCL): Lots of Allergies. Just One Little Pill, at
http://www.zyrtec.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
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that changes daily.81 Through e-mail subscription lists, the drug
manufacturers are not only encouraging consumer contact, but are
also contacting consumers. 82
Many of the manufacturers of histamine blockers, HMG-CoA
Reductase Inhibitors, and antidepressants have web sites
advertising their prescription drugs. 8 These web sites vary in
their levels of interactivity.8
As these web sites increase in
interactivity, the doctor-patient relationship is increasingly
undermined; as well as the manufacturers' justification for using
the Learned Intermediary Defense, by decreasing patients'
willingness to properly inform their physician and, therefore,
decreasing their reliance upon the physician's advice.85
1. www.allegra.com: The Histamine Receptor One Blocker Allegra"
Allegra is a tablet primarily used for remedying seasonal
allergies.87 The manufacturer's home web site allows consumers to
acquire a five-dollar coupon for this prescription drug if they
respond to a quiz, and learn about what allergies they might
have.8 The web site also explains to consumers why Allegra could
be more beneficial for them than other prescription remedies.89
The pages in the site also suggest that prior to leaving, the visitors
view the pollen forecast in their geographic region."0 Although this
site is largely informative for consumers, teaching them about
their allergies, 1 it nevertheless undercuts the doctor-patient
relationship. Because the manufacturer encourages consumers to
spend time on the site, and establishes a separate relationship
with the consumer, it weakens its Learned Intermediary Defense.
2.

www.zyrtec.com: The Histamine Receptor One Blocker Zyrtec92

Zyrtec is a daily one-dose pill, which remedies a variety of
allergies.9
The Zyrtec home web site does not differentiate

81. See, e.g., web sites cited supra note 80.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Miner, supra note 7, at 1.
86. Aventis, Once-Daily Allegra Fexonfenadine HCL 180 mg Tablets, at
http://www.allegra.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

91. Aventis, Once-Daily Allegra Fexonfenadine HCL 180 mg Tablets, at

http://www.allegra.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
92. PHARMACOLOGY: LIPPINCOTT'S ILLUSTRATED REVIEWS,

Index (Richard

A. Harvey & Pamela C. Champe eds., 2d ed. 2000).
93. Pfizer Inc., Zyrtec (R) (Cetirizine HCL): Lots of Allergies. Just One
Little Pill, at http://www.zyrtec.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
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between consumers and healthcare professionals. 9 The site allows
the consumer to learn about Zyrtec: what it is, its benefits, how to
take the drug, how to get the drug, personal stories, product
information, and even how to pronounce the name." Another link
on the page is called "understanding your allergies."" This page
provides consumers information on allergies, symptoms, allergens,
The web site allows
allergy-prevention tips, and a quiz.97
consumers to receive a ten-dollar coupon if they fill out a survey
mailed to them.98 Consumers can also view a pollen count for their
geographic area, subscribe to a pollen and allergy e-letter, or email the web site to a friend.99 The site also provides information
on understanding treatment options and adapting to responses."'
Another section of the web site encourages consumers to contact
the manufacturer to share their Zyrtec experience because the
manufacturer will listen. 1 1 Thus, like Allegra's site, 12 Zyrtec's site
is informative; however, the manufacturer further assumes the
traditional role of a doctor by encouraging consumers to talk about
their Zyrtec experiences.
3.

www.zocor.com: The HMG-CoA Reductase InhibitorZocor

10 3

Zocor's home site divides its initial links between consumers
This site describes and defines
and healthcare professionals."
cholesterol, heart disease, and the benefits of nutrition and
exercise.' ° It contains a video and testimonial by a professional
07
football coach.'0 9 This web site also has links to "healthful tools,"
94. Id.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Pfizer Inc., Zyrtec (R)(CetirizineHCI): Lots of Allergies. Just One Little
Pill, at http://www.zyrtec.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Aventis, Once-Daily Allegra Fexonfenadine HCL 180 mg Tablets, at
http://www.allegra.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
103. PHARMACOLOGY, supra note 92.
104. Mereck & Co., Zocor (Simvastatin) It's your future. Be There., at

www.zocor.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
105. Id.
106. See id.

(depicting the Dan Reeves' story in print and a film

testimonial).
107. Id. Within this "Healthful Tools" link consumers have many options.
Id. The heading of the page reads: "Where will you be when your grandson
gets his first taste of the ocean?" Id. Consumers can link to a "Cholesterol
I.Q." page and "[t]est their knowledge with this interactive page." Id. The
second "Healthful Tool" contains goal cards that a consumer can print out

from the web site. The goal cards allow consumers to keep track of their
significant cholesterol information. Id. Consumers can also print out exercise
journals to motivate them to stick to an exercise plan. Id. Another tool on this
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a glossary, a subscription list for e-mail about the web site's
updates, and prescription refill reminders."' 8
It also offers
consumers further information upon request.0 9 Once again,
although this web site informs consumers, it also establishes a
relationship with them by encouraging continued contact, which
undermines the doctor-patient relationship.
4.

www.flonase.com: The CoritcosteroidFlonase 1°

Flonase, a drug manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline, is a nasal
spray."' The Flonase home web site offers informational links for
healthcare professionals and patients."2 The patient site links
consumers to information about nasal allergies, a note to parents
about children's allergies, an "allergytalk"1" newsletter, various
resources, and a pollen count map."" The consumer can even
receive a free allergy kit."' In the "allergytalk" link, the site
discusses how to be a "Pollen Warrior," giving consumers advice
such as not wearing their contacts, washing their nose out with
salt water, grooming their pets, and making sure their nasal
prescription is filled "before the allergy season arrives.""6 While
this web site gives out general information educating consumers
about Flonase, it is also acting as a teacher or informer to
consumers, which is one of the roles of a physician. A drug
manufacturer using DTC Internet advertising in this manner is
effectively advertising itself into the physician's role, both
undercutting the doctor-patient relationship and the basis upon
which the manufacturer demands the Learned Intermediary
Defense.
5.

11 7

www.prozac.com: The Antidepressant Prozac

Prozac, an antidepressant, also has a home web site."8 The

page is the glossary of terms concerning heart disease terminology. Id. The

last "Healthful Tool" is a "Risk factor assessment." Id. The site informs
consumers that this quiz will help them identify the specific risk factors that
are correlated with high cholesterol. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. PHARMACOLOGY, supra note 92.
111. GlaxoWellcome Webmaster, Flonase (Fluticasone Propionate) Nasal
Spray, 50 mcg, at http://www. flonase.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

116. GlaxoWellcome Webmaster, Flonase (Fluticasone Propionate) Nasal

Spray, 50 mcg, at http://www. flonase.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
117. PHARMACOLOGY, supra note 92.
118. Eli Lilly
& Co.,
Prozac
(Fluoxetine
http://www.prozac.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).

Hydrochloride),

at
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site has a separate link for healthcare professionals.'19 The
consumer/patient site encourages consumer response to the web
site.120 Prozac's web site has, as do others, a consumer-oriented
warning section.12 ' In its "Taking Control" link the site informs
patients that the prescription process involves communicating
with their doctor and provides questions the patients may want to
ask their doctor.' The other noteworthy function of this web site
is the "Community" link. 123 Within this link consumers have an
opportunity to
share
testimonials
and
other "written
inspirations. ,,124
The page certainly interacts with the end
consumer. The page's features create interaction, encourage a
community atmosphere and multiple visits, and teach consumers
what they should ask their doctor; therefore, undermining the
doctor-patient relationship.
6. www.claritin.com: The Histamine Receptor One Blocker
1 25
Claritin
The histamine blocker, Claritin, has a home web site with
links that define allergies, allow consumers to view their
geographic pollen count, and allow consumers to subscribe to a
free e-mail group: "pollen alert."'26 Consumers can join "My
Claritin" and create a customized home page for their continued
pollen count needs and interests. 7 The web site also has a link
under its "Managing Allergies" tab, which advises consumers
about visiting their doctor concerning allergies."2 Within this link
there are several other links, including pages describing when a
patient should go see a doctor, what questions a patient should ask
the doctor, and what questions a doctor will ask the visiting
patient. 12' This section also describes what patients should expect
from a doctor's appointment concerning allergies."
The Claritin site encourages consumers to return. 31
It
teaches consumers by specifically advising what questions to

119. Id.
120. Id. (advertising on a scrolling marquee, "We'd like to hear from you").
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Eli
Lilly
& Co.,
Prozac
(Fluoxetine Hydrochloride), at
http://www.prozac.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
124. Id.
125. PHARMACOLOGY, supra note 92.
126. Clartin Products, Claritin 10 mg Tablets (Loratadine) For Seasonal
Allergy Relief, at http://www.claritin.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Clartin Products, Claritin 10 mg Tablets (Loratadine) For Seasonal
Allergy Relief, at http://www.claritin.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
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expect during a doctor's visit as well as the type of questions they
should pose to determine their allergies. 31 2 This site places the
drug manufacturer in the role of a teacher and counselor. The
manufacturer is directly communicating with the consumer, even
explaining the process of how to receive this drug from the doctor.
While innocuous on its face, such advertising undercuts a doctor's
professional and independent judgment and interferes in the
doctor-patient relationship.
When manufacturers use this type of advertising, the
overarching premise that a doctor is in a better position than drug
manufacturers to warn the end consumer becomes much less
convincing.13 If a consumer is in continuous contact with a drug
manufacturer, spending hours on an interactive web site sharing
testimonials about the drug, and discussing effects of the drug;
then the manufacturer, not the doctor, is spending greater time
with the consumer, is building a relationship with the consumer,13
and is the party giving the consumer advice on his or her
condition. Here, the drug manufacturer has advertised itself into
the role of the Learned Intermediary, and must accept
responsibility of warning the end consumer.
C. Effects of Applying or Revoking the Learned Intermediary
Defense
Continuing to apply the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to
DTC Internet advertising will have various consequences. 3 ' On
one hand, drug manufacturers could still market and promote
132. Id.

133. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1244, 1255 (discussing how the
four basic premises of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine are "absent in
[DTC] advertising of prescription drugs"). See also Lars, supra note 11, at 170
(describing how critics of DTC advertising find it "crass, profit-motivated
advertising of prescription drugs"). These critics also believe that "[o]nce
pharmaceutical manufacturers stoop to direct consumer advertising, the
argument goes, they no longer deserve the special treatment that they have
enjoyed under tort law." Id. See also Schwartz, supra note 35, at 845 (relating

that the prescription drug industry, like any other industry, sells their product
and attempts to create a demand). Schwartz advocates that when the drug

industry engages in advertising directly to consumers it has circumvented the
basis of its exception and should be held liable under product liability rules
like any other manufacturer. Id. at 848; Hall, supra note 26, at 462
(discussing how DTC advertising is essentially advertising "designed to create
a positive image of the product in the mind of the consumer").
134. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1252 (discussing how DTC advertising places
information directly before the consumer).
135. See Lars, supra note 11, at 152 ("argu[ing] that DTC promotion is of

educational value and will improve the physician-patient relationship,
increase patient compliance with drug therapy and physician visits and lower
drug prices."); Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259 (discussing various effects of their

holding of a rebuttable presumption that if the manufacturers duty to warn
the end consumer is met, the manufacturers complied with FDA guidlines).
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knowledge about their products,1 36 developing the Internet as a
reliable medium'37 for consumers to acquire information. 138
Unfortunately, on the other hand it allows mammoth drug
manufacturers, playing on an uneven field, to take advantage of
the uneducated consumer.'39
Drug manufacturers are "not
educating people about medicine they take-which is what needs
to be done-they're (referring to drug manufacturers) trying to
increase demand." ° Applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
allows drug manufacturers to artificially create demand,14 ' while
escaping liability."' This is poignantly evident when companies
use cost-effective web sites to advertise. Drug manufacturers can
reach and interact with millions of consumers from one web site.
The result is that manufacturers are not being held liable for their
products, while their profits increase and the price of drugs
decrease in the market. This forces the few injured consumers to
bear the cost for the entire market.
Disposing of the Learned Intermediary Defense would also
have many effects on the involved parties. ''
Prescription drug

136. See, e.g., Perez, 734 A.2d at 1263 (stating that pharmaceutical
companies have a right to communicate with the public); Tamar v. Terzian,
Direct-to-ConsumerPrescription Drug Advertising, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 149,
157 (1999) (describing the marketing expectations of the pharmaceutical drug
industry).
137. See Chester Chuang, Is There a Doctor in the House? Using Failure-toWarn Liability to Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing,75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1452, 1478 (2000) (expanding upon how the application of the Learned
Intermediary rule would enhance online doctor-patient relationships, which
would encourage the development of the Internet as a reliable source for
prescription drugs); Perez, 734 A.2d at 1254-59 (explaining why DTC
advertising undercuts the basic premise for the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine).
138. See Reeves, supra note 33, at 669-70 (discussing the FDA's initiatives to
inform consumers about prescription drugs).
139. See J. Howard Beales III & William C. MacLeod, Assessment of
PharmaceuticalAdvertisements: A CriticalAnalysis of the Criticism, 50 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 415, 415-16 (discussing opponents of drug advertising who
criticize that this type of advertising relies upon "questionable research,"
obscures unfavorable evidence, fails to "provide adequate information" to
consumers and exaggerates the benefits of one product over another).
140. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1252-53 (discussing how DTC advertising only
contains general warnings about each pharmaceutical drug's effect); Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation,112 HARv. L. REV. 1420, 1456 (1999) (discussing how
direct-to-consumer advertisements do not inform a patient sufficiently about
the inherent risks of using a specific prescription drug).
141. Miner, supra note 7, at 1.
142. See ca ses cited supra note 9.
143. Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining
the Strongest Case, 30 MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 466-67 (1997) (listing how too
much liability could decrease research and development, force actors to leave
the market, create shortages and higher costs).
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manufacturers would be subject to liability in failure to warn
cases, equalizing the burden of the drug manufacturers' failure to
warn across all its consumers, but increasing drug cost."' These
higher costs could translate into less advertising, 4' but the threat
of liability will likely yield more cautious advertising, and a betterwarned Juliet.' 6
This may create a disincentive for doctors to warn their
patients. 4 7 However, revoking the Learned Intermediary Defense
© will provide plaintiff-consumers a source of redress if indeed the
drug manufacturer causes serious injury about which the
manufacturer failed to warn consumers.

III. "SOME SHALL BE PARDON'D AND SOME PUNISHED" " A SLIDING
COMPROMISE

Choosing between polar opposites regarding the use of
Internet advertising and the availability of the Learned
Intermediary Defense is not an appropriate solution to these
problems.4 9 A better approach to DTC Internet advertising and
the Learned Intermediary Doctrine allows patient choice. The
following approach also allows manufacturers to advertise, while
still allowing patients redress when drug manufacturers' approach
to the interactivity of the Internet have gone beyond the logical
bounds of their defense."0
If courts decide along bifurcated lines concerning DTC
advertising " and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, there will
T

144. See Lars, supra note 11, at 152 (discussing how DTC advertising is
"misleading by failing to adequately communicate the risk information, and
that such promotion will damage the physician-patient relationship, increase
drug prices, increase liability actions, and lead to over-medication and drug
abuse").
145. See, e.g., Lars, supra note 11, at 169 (describing how manufacturers
may react to further liability if the duty to warn is expanded by "conveying far
less rather than more information to patients").
146. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1244, 1262 (elaborating that
the court holds a patient's interest for accurate and reliable information to
supercede a manufacturer's interest in being shielded from liability in failure
to warn cases).
147. See Lars, supra note 11, at 179 (expounding that "such a solution may
work to undermine effective dissemination of risk information to patients
because the one party best situated to convey such techinical information in
understandable terms will face reduced incentives to do so if the
manufacturers also must provide warnings").
148. Shakespeare, supra note 1, at 1099.
149. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
150. See id. (discussing generally a centrist approach with other forms of
advertising).
151. The first case that directly correlated the revocation of the Learned
Intermediary defense with DTC in the prescription drug setting was Perez v.
Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). There, the court held that if
prescription drug manufacturers advertise directly to consumers they can no
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be consequences on both ends of the spectrum which will be
unsatisfactory to both consumers and drug manufacturers. 52 If
courts continue to apply the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to
DTC advertising, although increasing patient choice, 53 this
defense will allow drug manufacturers the opportunity to take
If the Learned
advantage of uneducated consumers."
Intermediary Doctrine is not used as a defense to liability, drug
manufacturers may choose to decrease advertising because of the
risk of liability, thus decreasing both consumer access to
information about prescription drugs.. and patient choice, which
will inflate the price of drugs.15 6 Instead of either of these choices
the courts should take a more centrist approach: measuring the
interactivity of each web site to determine if it undercuts the
doctor-patient relationship.
The middle-of-the-road approach suggested herein adopts a
test that courts have been administering recently to determine
whether a long-arm statute's jurisdiction extends over Internet
companies accessed by consumers in the forum.'57 As the U.S.
Supreme Court foresaw in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
"modem commercial life" will reach a point where the defendant's
presence in the forum will be obviated. 58 With modern
communications, an advertiser and manufacturer do not have to
be in the forum to reach the end consumer. Some companies have
subjected themselves to specific jurisdiction in the states in which
they advertised depending upon the interactivity level of their web
site. 9 The same should apply to prescription drug web sites. To
longer use the Learned Intermediary Defense. Id. at 1251.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
Reeves, supra note 33, at 675-76
Beales, supra note 139, at 415-16.
Lars, supra note 11, at 141.

156. Id.
157. E.g., Caulder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Panavision Int'l L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); LFG, LLC, v. Zapata Corp., 78 F.

Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Pheasant Run, Inc. v. Moyse, No. 98 C 4202,
1999 WL 58562, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 1999); Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97 C
5453, 1998 WL 299678, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998); Vitullo v. Velocity
Powerboats, Inc. No. 97 C 8745, 1998 WL 246152, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27,
1998); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.

1997).
158. See generally Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985);
Caulder, 465 U.S. at 785 (1984); Pheasant Run, Inc. 1999 WL 58562, at *6;
Vitullo, 1999 WL 246152, at *7; Scherr, 1998 WL 299678, at *4-*6; LFG, 78 F.
Supp. 2d at 734-38; Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
159. See LFG, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 736 (characterizing a "portal" web site as

interactive when it provided access to "internet search engines, e-mail
accounts, discussion groups, web sites categorized by topic, and directories,
among other things"); Pheasant Run, Inc., 1999 WL 58562, at *2-3
(characterizing plaintiffs one paragraph internet advertisement, which did
contain plaintiffs telephone number

but did not allow for electronic
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the extent that the manufacturer interacts with the end consumer,
the manufacturer should no longer be able to consistently use the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine as a defense.
The sliding-scale test used by courts to determine the
interactivity of web sites was introduced in an opinion by the
Western District of Pennsylvania in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot
Corn, Inc. 160 Within this sliding-scale test, the court characterized
161
three levels of interactivity of a defendant company's web site.
The first level of web site interactivity is informational and
passive. Information is accessible to users, but is only posted on
the web site. 6 ' The second level allows the user to exchange
Courts retain
information with the host of the web site. 163
jurisdiction over web sites within this level depending upon the
The
"level of interactivity and commercial nature" of the site.'
third and highest level is a web site that allows the user to
transact business with the manufacturer.'6'
A.

The Passive Web Site

At the bottom of this "interactive" technology scale is the
Manufacturers are simply switching mediums
passive web site.'
and placing print advertising on the Internet, and in essence their
interaction with the end consumer is minimal. 67 Courts reason
that there must be "something more" than simply placing
information on an Internet site to be considered an interactive web
site. " '
In the setting of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine,
communication as a passive web site); Scherr, 1998 WL 299678, at *5
(characterizing a free internet informational electronic mini-journal as having
a low interactivity rate, even though visitors exchanged their e-mail addresses
with the company); Vitullo, 1998 WL 246152, at *6 (characterizing a web site
containing the capacity for customers to e-mail the retailer with its "contact

us" button as an interactive web site); Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26
(holding that a web site was interactive and not passive because the company
had not simply posted information on the web site). See also CoolSavings.com,
Inc. v. IQ Commerce Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1001-03 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(characterizing a web site with a "clip" and "pop up" coupon as interactive).
160. See Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (setting out the specific

personal jurisdiction test for web sites that are based upon the interactivity, or
the level of exchanged information that occurs on web sites). This jurisdiction
test is a sliding-scale test which includes three categories: passive,
intermediate, and transactional. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1123-24.
166. See Vitullo, 1998 WL 246152, at *5 (characterizing passive web sites as

sites that simply place information on the web).
167. Id.
168. Id. at *5. See PheasantRun, Inc., 1999 WL 58562, at *2-3 (holding that
a one paragraph advertisement on the Internet, that did not enable the user to
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prescription drug manufacturers' web sites that are passive should
still be able to use the Learned Intermediary Defense. While these
web sites do reach the end consumers, the sites do not interact
with the end consumer, instead contacting the user only minimally
through their advertising. Thus, such web sites do not undercut
the premise upon which the Learned Intermediary Doctrine is
based.
B. The Intermediary Web Site
The intermediate category of interactivity is where most web
sites fall. 6 9 Courts characterize these web sites as interactive and
commercial.' Within this category there is a range of web sites. 7'
For example, when a manufacturer gives consumers access to a
web site designed for interaction, the success of which depends
upon interaction, the courts consider these web sites interactive
enough to warrant minimum contacts. 7 2 Some of these sites are
called "portal" web sites and give consumers access to search
engines, e-mail accounts, discussion groups, web sites categorized
by topic, and directories that create a communal feeling.'73 Courts
refer to this concept as an "Internet neighborhood," promoting long

contact the defendant directly, was a passive site). For further delineation
between the levels of interactivity see Scherr, 1998 WL 299678, at *5
(discussing the interactivity level of a web site, where the user had direct
contact with the host, as a web site that fell within the second category:
intermediate).
169. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
170. Vitullo, 1998 WL 246152, at *5.
171. Pheasant Run, Inc., 1999 WL 58562, at *6. Web sites can differ
dramatically within this category. A company may have one e-mail address on
its page precluding it from falling in the passive category, but in intent, the
web page is more passive than it is interactive. Id. The Northern District of
Illinois held that a defendant's web site was interactive because the inclusion
of e-mail addresses facilitated conversations between the defendant and its
potential customers. Id. Similarly in International Star Registry of Ill. v.
Bowman-Haight Ventures, Inc., No. 98 C 6823, 1999 WL 300285, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. May 6, 1999), the court held that a web site inviting potential customers to
make inquiries via e-mail made it more interactive. Zapata's web site was
also characterized as interactive because it was a portal web site and had a
contact button for help and to join their mailing list. LFG, LLC v. Zapata
Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 731, 736-37.
172. See LFG, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 736 (holding that an interactive "portal" site
was designed for user interaction and the success of the web site depended
upon the number of users, thus characterizing this site as highly interactive).
A portal web site is, as the court defined it, a "super web site" providing a
'variety of services, aiming to be 'one-stop shops' for internet needs." Id. at
736. This type of web site usually "offer[s] access to internet search engines, email accounts, discussion groups, web sites categorized by topic, and
directories, among other things-all free to the user." Id. These web sites
"generate their income by selling [Internet] advertising space." Id.
173. Id.
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visits by users and ensuring that visitors will return."' Courts
also consider "contact us" buttons as highly interactive."' The
purpose of this web site feature is to contact and interact with
consumers for the direct purpose of financial gain. 17 6 Such web
sites are interacting, discussing, and creating a community or
neighborhood for consumers and encouraging them to return.
Manufacturers of pharmaceutical products who use this form of
DTC advertising are undercutting the doctor-patient relationship,
which is the very relationship to which they appeal when asserting
the defense of a Learned Intermediary.
Thus, the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine should not apply to manufacturers using
highly interactive intermediate web sites.
C.

The TransactionalWeb Site
While transactional web sites that sell pharmaceutical drugs
do exist, such sites are not the focus of this Comment. 7
Obviously, if a manufacturer is bypassing the Learned
Intermediary altogether, and completely undercutting the doctorpatient relationship, 78 if not obliterating it, the manufacturer
should not be allowed to use the Learned Intermediary Doctrine.
The use of this sliding-scale may decrease some advertising,
but, because of Internet profitability, will likely change the
advertising from a consumer and manufacturer interaction-based
advertising to a primarily informative type of advertising.
CONCLUSION

Using this sliding-scale, while complicated, will lead to a more
equitable use of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine.
Those
pharmaceutical companies that are interacting with the consumer
174. Id. at 737.

175. Id.
176. LFG, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 736-37 (describing an interactive web site

designed for user interaction and the company's purposes for developing these
web sites).
177. See generally Chester Chuang, Is There a Doctor in the House? Using
Failure-to-Warn Liability to Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75

N.Y.U. L. REV. 1452 (2000), for further discussion on the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine and transactional web sites that sell pharmaceutical
drugs.
178. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276-77 (holding that
when a drug manufacturer knew or had reason to know that the prescription

drug would not be administered by a physician it had a duty to warn the end
consumer); Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1244, 1255 (listing a premise

for the doctrine as the "complexity of the subject" and discussing the "doctor
knows best" of need for the patient's informed consent); Allen v. G.D. Searle,

708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (discussing the birth control/contraceptive
exception to the rule); Hall, supra note 26, at 462-64 (describing the exceptions
to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine); Schwartz, supra note 35, at 832-33
(discussing the two exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Rule).
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and undercutting the doctor-patient relationship will not be able to
use the doctrine. However, those that do not undercut the basic
premises of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine will continue to
have the ability to utilize this defense. Within these bounds the
consumers will continue to have choices and will continue to have
access to information, but will not be lured into a neighborhood of
advertising that undercuts the foundations of the doctor-patient
relationship.

'

